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Recent research into the psychology of conspiracy belief has highlighted the importance of
belief systems in the acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories. We examined a large
sample of conspiracist (pro-conspiracy-theory) and conventionalist (anti-conspiracy-theory)
comments on news websites in order to investigate the relative importance of promoting
alternative explanations vs. rejecting conventional explanations for events. In accordance
with our hypotheses, we found that conspiracist commenters were more likely to
argue against the opposing interpretation and less likely to argue in favor of their own
interpretation, while the opposite was true of conventionalist commenters. However,
conspiracist comments were more likely to explicitly put forward an account than
conventionalist comments were. In addition, conspiracists were more likely to express
mistrust and made more positive and fewer negative references to other conspiracy
theories. The data also indicate that conspiracists were largely unwilling to apply the
“conspiracy theory” label to their own beliefs and objected when others did so, lending
support to the long-held suggestion that conspiracy belief carries a social stigma. Finally,
conventionalist arguments tended to have a more hostile tone. These tendencies in
persuasive communication can be understood as a reflection of an underlying conspiracist
worldview in which the details of individual conspiracy theories are less important than a
generalized rejection of official explanations.
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“The Internet was made for conspiracy theory: it is a conspiracy
theory: one thing leads to another, always another link leading you
deeper into no thing and no place.”
(Stewart, 1999, p. 18).
Conspiracy theories, defined as allegations that powerful peo-
ple or organizations are plotting together in secret to achieve
sinister ends through deception of the public (Abalakina-Paap
et al., 1999; Wood et al., 2012), have long been an important ele-
ment of popular discourse. With the advent of the Internet, they
have become more visible than ever. Although the psychologi-
cal literature on conspiracy belief has a relatively short history,
with most of the relevant research having been conducted only
within the past twenty years, it has revealed a great deal regard-
ing individual differences between those who generally believe
conspiracy theories (whom we call “conspiracists”) and those
who prefer conventional explanations (whom we call “conven-
tionalists”). Conspiracy beliefs have been shown to be positively
correlated with mistrust of other people (Goertzel, 1994) and
authorities (Swami et al., 2010); feelings of powerlessness and low
self-esteem (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999); superstition, beliefs in
the paranormal, and schizotypy (Darwin et al., 2011); a perceived
lack of control (Hamsher et al., 1968; Whitson and Galinsky,
2008); a Machiavellian approach to social interaction (Douglas
and Sutton, 2011); and openness to experience (Swami et al.,
2010; but see Swami et al., 2011).
At the present time, questionnaire-based investigations of
individual differences make up the bulk of the existing research,
although experimental approaches are emerging (e.g., Douglas
and Sutton, 2008; Jolley andDouglas, 2013). A fairly recent devel-
opment in the field has been an acknowledgement that in addition
to trait-like variables and transient psychological states, ideologies
and broad belief systems play a substantial role in conspiracy the-
ory belief. For example, in an examination of conspiracy theories
regarding an alleged cover-up of the divinity of Mary Magdalene
and the bloodline of Christ, Newheiser et al. (2011) demon-
strated that the plausibility of these theories hinged largely on
broader beliefs about the world. People with traditional Christian
beliefs were likely to reject such theories out of hand, while those
with a more New Age approach were much more receptive. In
a similar vein, Lewandowsky et al. (2013b) demonstrated that
rejection of climate science (though not explicitly conspiracist)
is determined in part by ideological concerns, with libertarian
free-market ideology, apparently predisposing people to believe
that anthropogenic global warming is an unscientific hoax. It is
clear, then, that individual conspiracy theories or related counter-
normative explanations can seem more or less likely depending
on how they comport with other beliefs held by the audience.
Some researchers have gone further, proposing the existence
of a conspiracist worldview—a belief system conducive to con-
spiracy beliefs in general (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al.,
2010; Wood et al., 2012). This proposal stems primarily from the
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 409 | 1
Wood and Douglas Online conspiracies
finding that beliefs in unrelated conspiracy theories tend to inter-
correlate: for example, someone who believes that Princess Diana
was deliberately assassinated is also more likely to believe that the
moon landing was a hoax. Indeed, Wood et al. (2012) demon-
strated that even beliefs in directly contradictory conspiracy the-
ories were positively correlated with one another, indicating that
conspiracy beliefs may be held together not by direct agreement
with one another, but by mutual agreement with higher-order
beliefs about the world. One particularly important element of
the conspiracist worldview is thought to be a generalized oppo-
sition to official or received narratives. In this view, conspiracy
belief is not about believing in particular alternative theories, but
in disbelieving in whatever the official story is. This tendency has
been informally noted by Dean (2002), who described most con-
spiracy theories as “bits and pieces without a plot. . . [that] fail
to delineate any conspiracy at all. They simply counter conven-
tional narratives with suspicions and allegations that, more often
than not, resist coherent emplotment” (p. 92). Likewise, Clarke
(2007) observed that conspiracy theories are often extremely
vague, particularly in the Internet age.
If this is the case, then for people who hold a conspiracist
worldview, the specifics of a conspiracy theory are less important
than its identity as a conspiracy and its opposition to the official
explanation. The important element is that those in power are
lying and cannot be trusted, and that they are covering up some-
thing sinister. Opposition to officialdom, in this sense, parallels
the generalized prejudice that Adorno et al. (1950) found to be
strong enough to overcome contradictions between different anti-
Jewish stereotypes. More than being a specific belief that Jews are
overly secretive or overly intrusive, anti-Semitism appears to be
more of a general belief that Jews are generally unpleasant peo-
ple. Likewise, conspiracy theory belief appears to be more of a
negative belief than a positive one—it is more concerned with say-
ing what the cause of a condition or event was not (i.e., whatever
the official explanation is) than with putting forward a specific
alternative account.
An opportunity to test this idea presents itself in the form of
observation of online discourse. In spite of, or perhaps because
of, the lack of mainstream public acceptance for their theories,
many conspiracists, both prominent and otherwise, appear to see
themselves as having a duty to spread their views to the public
at large. They often exhort the unthinking masses to “wake up”
(e.g., Crane, 2008; Byers, 2009; Icke, 2012). This is a reasonable
reaction: given a belief that people’s lives are being manipulated
by malevolent forces beyond their control, most would probably
agree that trying to spread the word about that fact is a good idea.
Outspoken conventionalists, such as those in the “skeptic” move-
ment (e.g., Randi, 1982; Sagan, 1995; Shermer, 1997; Novella,
2009), find most conspiracy theories to be misguided at best and
destructive at worst, and so make a point of arguing against them
in the public sphere.
This discussion is voluminous and highly visible in many are-
nas, perhaps none more so than news website comment sections.
Articles about topics for which popular conspiracy theories exist,
such as 9/11, the moon landing, and vaccines, can have tens of
thousands of comments, most of which are devoted to advancing
or refuting allegations of conspiracy. These comments are often
archived along with the associated articles for months or years
afterward, which provides an excellent opportunity for archival
research to give some insight into the thoughts and beliefs of those
writing them (e.g., Fat et al., 2012; Loke, 2012; Sisask et al., 2012).
The present study consists of an examination of a large num-
ber of conspiracy theory-related persuasive comments on news
stories. Such analysis of online discourse as a method of exam-
ining psychological states has increased in prominence as the
Internet has become a more popular place to discuss one’s ideas.
The subject and pace of online discussion has been shown to be
a more or less reliable barometer of public concern over social
issues (Roberts et al., 2002; Scharkow andVogelgesang, 2011), and
emotional reactions expressed online can be used to consistently
predict political approval ratings (Gonzalez-Bailon et al., 2012).
Quantitative analysis of online discussion has also been used to
gain insight into the social psychology of groups with fringe views
(Douglas et al., 2005), attitudes toward Tourette’s Syndrome (Fat
et al., 2012), and racial views (Loke, 2012). Qualitative research
on online discourse has been more common, including a study
demonstrating the evolution of conspiracy theories over time in
response to evidence (Lewandowsky et al., 2013a). In the context
of conspiracy theories in particular, there are several advan-
tages to content analysis of online commentary. The self-selective
nature of online communication allows for the collection of a
great deal of data regarding opinions that may be held by only a
minority of people; moreover, the degree of anonymity facilitates
the honest expression of opinions that might not be held in high
social esteem elsewhere (e.g., Douglas et al., 2005; Loke, 2012).
There are some caveats associated with analyzing persuasive
comments in particular. While external validity may benefit from
observing behavior in a naturalistic setting, there is some degree
of uncertainty regarding the internal validity of any conclusions
drawn from such methods. Most obviously, there is the issue
of to what degree the content of persuasive communications
reflects the properties of the author rather than the demands
of the situation. Rather than faithful representations of internal
psychological processes, commenters’ methods of argumentation
might instead reflect strategic considerations regarding the audi-
ence, the venue, and the subject matter. While self-presentation
is very often a concern in psychological research, even in labora-
tory settings, such demandsmay be especially salient in a situation
where one’s goal is implicitly (or even explicitly) to persuade oth-
ers rather than to provide an honest and straightforward account
of one’s beliefs. Indeed, some research has shown that people do
adapt their persuasive techniques according to their knowledge of
the audience and the subject (Friestad andWright, 1999; Douglas
et al., 2010; Vogel et al., 2010).
The question of whether we can expect persuasive communi-
cation to accurately reflect inner psychological processes is not
easily answerable, as the effect of lay persuasive knowledge on
generation of persuasive arguments is fairly sparse. While there
is a substantial body of research on lay persuasive knowledge, the
vast majority of it focuses instead on how such knowledge affects
susceptibility to the persuasive messages of others. However, it
is well-established that people tend to rely heavily on projec-
tion for predicting others’ behavior—that is, they use themselves
as a model for prediction. This effect is especially strong when
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relatively little is known about the target [for a review, see Robbins
and Krueger (2005)]. In general, then, it is likely that persuaders
use the self as a model for argument generation: in other words,
they argue in a way that they would themselves find convincing.
This, in turn, suggests that the types of arguments used by per-
suaders can contain information relevant to understanding how
they think about the issue at hand.
The tendency to use social projection is especially relevant in
online settings. Much online discussion is either fully anonymous
or conducted under pseudonyms, greatly limiting the amount
of information available about the other party in a discussion.
As such, we assume for the purposes of the present study that
people will generally tend to use arguments that they them-
selves would find most convincing were they the audience rather
than the persuader. This, in turn, should reflect the structure of
their belief systems—the arguments that people find most con-
vincing are those that match up with how they view the world
(Darwin et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012;
Lewandowsky et al., 2013b). To that end, we systematically coded
and analyzed conspiracist and conventionalist persuasive com-
ments from four major news websites on articles relating to 9/11
from the period of July 1st through December 31st, 2011, encom-
passing the months surrounding the tenth anniversary of the
attacks.
9/11 conspiracy theories provide an excellent research subject
for several reasons. First, the community associated with these
theories, known as the 9/11 Truth Movement, is noted for its
substantial online presence and focus on Internet proselytizing.
Bartlett and Miller (2011) observed that the movement’s “mass
membership backbone” (p. 45) devotes a substantial amount of
time to producing large numbers of online comments, and Clarke
(2007) saw the Truth Movement as a paradigmatic example of
Internet conspiracy culture. Second, the timing was fortuitous,
with the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, sure to herald a
number of stories on the subject and therefore many relevant
comments, having occurred shortly before data collection com-
menced. The recency of the materials lowered the probability
of comments having been expunged from archives or lost as an
unintended consequence of comment software upgrades. Third,
just as the Truth Movement has a substantial online presence, so
too do its conventionalist opponents in the skeptic movement.
We therefore expected that there would be a good deal of debate
between the two sides, providing further raw materials for analy-
sis. Finally, the Truth Movement is a well-established community
with a substantial intellectual output, including popular books
(e.g., Griffin, 2004), conference circuits, several sub-organizations
such as Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth, and at least one
peer-reviewed journal, the Journal of 9/11 Studies. There is sub-
stantial debate within the Truth Movement regarding whether
9/11 was a controlled demolition, a deliberate intelligence fail-
ure, or even the result of exotic space-based weaponry (Barber,
2008). In short, its body of work is varied, voluminous, and well-
developed, and should therefore be able to provide a wide range
of different arguments for analysis.
If our reasoning regarding the influence of projection on
persuasive tactics holds, we should see systematic differences
in the characteristics of conspiracist and conventionalist argu-
ments. Specifically, we should be able to replicate earlier results
demonstrating that unrelated conspiracy beliefs are intercorre-
lated (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010; Wood et al.,
2012)—in this case, conspiracist comments should contain more
positive (and fewer negative) references to unrelated conspiracy
theories compared with conventionalist comments. Examining
a long-standing correlate of conspiracy belief, we also investi-
gated the degree to which comments contained explicit expres-
sions of mistrust, predicting that conspiracist comments would
be more likely to express mistrust of authorities or other tar-
gets than conventionalist comments (e.g., Wright and Arbuthnot,
1974; Simmons and Parsons, 2005). Further, we examined expres-
sions of powerlessness, and predicted that conspiracist comments
would express more concerns about power, as feelings of pow-
erlessness have been shown to correlate reliably with conspiracy
theory belief (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). Replicating the previ-
ously established relationships between conspiracy beliefs, trust,
and power would increase confidence in the present study’s
methods and help to justify any novel results derived therefrom.
In addition to verifying the utility of this archival approach
by replicating previous results, we made several novel predic-
tions. First, if we are correct in our contention that much of the
conspiracist worldview is based on a generalized rejection of offi-
cial explanations rather than on positing particular alternative
narratives, conspiracist comments should focus on refuting con-
ventional explanations more than on presenting or supporting
specific conspiracy theories. Therefore, conspiracist comments,
relative to conventionalist comments, should be more likely to
derogate rival explanations and less likely to promote their own.
Second, we elected to examine the veracity of the long-held con-
tention that “conspiracy theory” and “conspiracy theorist” carry
an intellectual stigma (e.g., Bratich, 2002, 2008; Coady, 2006). If
this is true, people should be unwilling to apply the term to them-
selves and should object when others do so. As such, we predicted
that conspiracists would avoid applying the term “conspiracy the-
ory” to their own beliefs (or “conspiracy theorists” to themselves),
and would attempt to dispute others’ usage of the term.While this
might seem an obvious prediction—and indeed many authors
take it as a given that the term is stigmatized—to our knowl-
edge there have not yet been any empirical investigations of this
contention.
Finally, another possible avenue by which the spread of con-
spiracy theories could be fruitfully understood is social influence
theory (Latané, 1981). Since 9/11 conspiracy theories are (at least
in the West) an opinion held by a vocal minority attempting to
effect change, social influence theory (Latané, 1981) would pre-
dict that conventionalists, if they are good majority influencers,
are more likely to show patterns consistent with normative social
influence. In particular, Bratich (2008) has highlighted the hostil-
ity of intellectual orthodoxy toward conspiracist explanations for
events and the labelling of conspiracists as paranoid or otherwise
mentally ill (c.f. Hofstadter, 1964; Kalichman et al., 2010). At the
same time, conspiracists are often hostile in a different way, dis-
missing conventionalists as naïve, gullible, and either unwitting
dupes or willing stooges of the conspiracy (Crane, 2008; Byford,
2011). Therefore, we examined the hostility of each persuasive
comment, whether characterized by outright insults, threats, dis-
missive sarcasm, accusations of complicity, or other hostile or
insulting content.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
ARTICLES
The raw data consisted of the comment sections of various online
news articles. Samples were taken from news articles posted
between July 1st and December 31st, 2011, on four mainstream
news websites: ABC (American Broadcasting Company) News,
CNN, the Independent, and the Daily Mail. This date range
was chosen because of the large number of 9/11-related articles
around the time of the tenth anniversary of the attacks, and these
four news sites were selected on the reasoning that an ideal sam-
ple would not be restricted to a single country, journalistic style,
or ideological position, as well as for more practical reasons such
as search capabilities, comment archiving, and unpaid access.
Relevant articles were selected by searching for a series of terms
within the specified date range: “9/11,” “11/9,” “September 11th,”
“11th September,” “world trade center,” “world trade centre,”
“wtc,” “al-qaeda,” “shanksville,” and “building 7.” Where possi-
ble (i.e., the Mail and Independent) the websites’ own advanced
search functions were used; on the remaining sites, we conducted
the required searches using Google News.
COMMENTS
For each article that resulted from these searches, the public com-
ment sections were read, and from these, we extracted verbatim
all relevant comments regarding the 9/11 conspiracy theories.
Specifically, since only persuasive comments were of interest, only
comments containing original content that could be considered
persuasive, or written with the intent to persuade, were extracted.
Our analyses, for the most part, are predicated upon the idea that
people will tend to project in order to construct persuasive argu-
ments; non-persuasive comments, therefore, are written without
regard to their perceived efficacy in convincing the other party
(or neutral parties), as that is not their aim. To operationalize this
constraint we adhered to four criteria.
1. The comment must not consist solely of insults, ridicule, or
threats (e.g., “u stupid sheeple need 2 wake up lol,” “Let me
know what your home address is, and we can have a frank
“discussion” about your idiotic conspiracy theories”). This
criterion was adopted because insults on their own are not
persuasive, and while insults may be relevant to the hostility
and stigma variables, they are irrelevant to the majority of the
analyses we wished to conduct.
2. The comment must not consist solely of “meta” discussion
(e.g., “I see the government disinfo machine is working over-
time with all the shills posting here,” “can’t believe CNN
is letting these tinfoil hat nutjobs hijack a story about the
9/11 memorial”). As with insults, “meta” comments do not
make persuasive arguments, and are in fact about entirely dif-
ferent subject matter—they are concerned with the minutia
of discussion rather than with the conspiracy theories and
conventional explanations in question.
3. The comment must not consist solely of a link to an exter-
nal website, YouTube video, or similar, or a link with minimal
description that adds no meaningful content (e.g., “go to
ae911truth.org for some informed discussion about 9/11,”
“google Popular Mechanics 9/11 debunking”). While it would
be in principle possible to code the contents of such videos,
websites, and other bodies of Web content, they are usu-
ally prohibitively large (particularly in the case of exhorta-
tions to conduct a Web search for a particular phrase, such
as “Building 7,” that returns millions of results) and would
require an entirely different set of coding criteria. Moreover,
the linked content was uniformly the work of others rather
than the commenter’s own reasoning, as would be necessary
for our reasoning concerning the link between argument gen-
eration, projection, and internal psychological representations
to hold.
4. The comment must not be copied verbatim from an external
source. This was determined by conducting web searches when
a comment was extremely long, contained unusual formatting
such as inappropriate line breaks, or was out of character in
terms of word choice or grammatical ability for a previously
recognized commenter. As with external links, these passages
were not generated by the commenters and the projection line
of reasoning therefore cannot be assumed to apply in this case
as it would in the case of original arguments. As such, when
an otherwise original post contained a passage quoted from an
external source, only the original content was coded.
The author of each comment was recorded, along with the Web
address of the parent news article and whether the comment was
a direct reply to another, previously posted comment.
CODING
Once the comments were collected, they were coded according
to the hypotheses of interest. The tone of the comment (con-
spiracist or conventionalist) was of interest to all analyses, so this
was the first content variable coded. Conspiracist comments were
identified as any that either directly put forward a conspiratorial
account of the events of 9/11, in whole or in part; that challenged
the official account in a manner implying conspiracy or com-
plicity among governments, intelligence services, corporations,
occult associations, or secret societies; that otherwise favorably
referenced common tropes of the 9/11 Truth Movement and its
associated body of arguments, such as cryptic allusions to the fate
of World Trade Center (WTC) Building 7, popular quotations
from conspiracy websites or prominent theorists, and so on; that
responded to conventionalist comments in a manner implying
that the original commenter had the wrong impression in think-
ing that the attacks were perpetrated by agents of Al-Qaeda; or
that was somewhat ambiguous in isolation but was written by a
commenter previously observed to make conspiracist arguments
or in the context of an argument or point made in the parent arti-
cle that otherwise made the commenter’s intent clear. Therefore,
a comment on an article about a new book on 9/11 reading “Does
the book explain how WTC7 imploded from fire, how a single
passport was found intact within hours, how Bin Laden was in the
American hospital in Dubai weeks before, how fighter jets were
diverted 1000s of miles away, how NORAD was ordered to stand
down. . . ” was coded as conspiracist. While this comment does
not directly allege conspiracy, it refers obliquely to many com-
mon 9/11 conspiracist arguments and seems clearly intended to
raise doubt regarding conventional explanations of 9/11.
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Conversely, comments were coded as conventionalist if they
explicitly endorsed or provided evidence in support of the main-
stream account of 9/11 or another unofficial yet non-conspiracist
explanation (such as Al-Qaeda independently planting bombs in
the Twin Towers or bringing explosives onto the hijacked aircraft);
if they argued against specific 9/11 conspiracy theories or con-
spiracist arguments such as those shown in the sample comment
above; or, as in the case of conspiracist comments, if they were
ambiguous in isolation but were written by a previously estab-
lished conventionalist or in the context of a discussion thread
or point made in the parent article that otherwise made clear
the commenter’s intent. For instance, the comment “LOL! Wow!
What a conspiracy. Man, that tin foil hat has got to be tight today.
Thousands of conspirators would be needed to pull off even a
fraction of what you claim. And every one of them has been silent
for almost 10 years now. Incredible. . . ” was coded as convention-
alist due to its argument that the conspiracy explanations of 9/11
are implausible and general mockery of conspiracists.
Since the first hypothesis concerned the number of unrelated
conspiracy theories mentioned favorably and unfavorably in the
comment, we coded two separate variables for each comment:
one comprised the number of other conspiracy theories men-
tioned favorably, and the other comprised the number of other
conspiracy theories mentioned unfavorably. Importantly, these
counts did not include “superconspiracies,” or conspiracies that
orchestrate other conspiracies (Barkun, 2006), of which 9/11 was
thought to be a part. For instance, if a commenter accused the
Bilderberg Group or the Illuminati of masterminding the 9/11
attacks, this would be considered part of the 9/11 conspiracy the-
ory rather than a separate conspiracy theory entirely. However, if
the commenter expressed the opinion that the Illuminati orches-
trated both 9/11 and the JFK assassination, the latter would be
included as an additional conspiracy theory.
The next hypotheses concerned trust and powerlessness. We
therefore coded whether each comment contained expressions
of mistrust, whether broadly or narrowly targeted (e.g., “never
believe what the media tells you” or “nobody’s trustworthy these
days”), as well as powerlessness (e.g., “they’ve won, there’s noth-
ing we can do”).
Our primary hypothesis, and the onemost relevant to the issue
of conspiracist belief systems, concerned whether the comments
contained positive or negative arguments. As such we coded for
two separate binary-valued variables: first, whether the comment
contained advocacy of the person’s favored interpretation (e.g.,
“thermite residue in the wreckage is consistent with controlled
demolition,” “office fires can burn hot enough, uncontrolled, to
weaken structural steel to the point of collapse”); second, whether
the comment contained derogation of the opposing interpre-
tation (“there is no way that a plane would have left so little
wreckage at the Pentagon,” “it’s totally implausible that such a
large conspiracy could be kept secret for so long”); and third,
whether the comment directly put forward an explanation for
either the entirety of 9/11 or an element of it (“9/11 was an
inside job,” “the collapse was caused by terrorists flying planes
into buildings, nothing more”).
We were also interested in how commenters used the term
“conspiracy theory.” As such, we created a nominally-coded
variable with values representing the different ways in which the
comment used the phrase and its variations: not at all; applied
to an opposing interpretation (“that’s just a crazy conspiracy the-
ory”); applied to the commenter’s own interpretation (“it may be
a conspiracy theory, but it’s still true”); both; or disputed in its
applicability (“calling something a conspiracy theory is just a way
of silencing dissent”). This included variations on the term, such
as “conspiracy theorist,” “silly conspiracy nonsense,” etc.
The final hypothesis concerned the degree to which persua-
sive conspiracist and conventionalist comments were hostile. As
such, we coded the hostility of each comment toward those who
hold opposing views on a scale of one (not at all hostile) to five
(extremely hostile).
An example of how one post was coded on all variables is as
follows:
“No it’s you who needs to check his/her facts, Delft University
burnt from the sixth floor to the top and only a portion of the
building on north side collapsed, check out the photos of the
building after the fire they’re easy to find. They even managed to
remove all of the books from the library on the first floor undam-
aged after the partial collapse. Nothing about the WTC buildings
or Delft University’s structures, fires, or collapse/partial collapse
are comparable. As far as I can tell the WTC buildings are still the
only large steel framed high-rise buildings to suffer total collapse
due to fire, your poorly researched comment doesn’t disprove the
statement anyway.”
This comment, from aDailyMail article, was part of a lengthy dis-
cussion regarding the plausibility of theWTCbuildings collapsing
due to fires and structural damage, as posited in the conventional
explanation. This comment was made in response to a conven-
tionalist who claimed that there is precedent for similar collapses
and that the official explanation is therefore plausible. The com-
ment claims that the WTC collapse and the example given by the
conventionalist are not comparable, and emphasizes the unique
(and therefore suspicious) nature of theWTC collapse. This com-
ment was therefore coded as derogating rival explanations, but
not advocating its own or directly posing a cause of the collapse.
It contains no expressions of mistrust or powerlessness, mentions
no other conspiracy theories, and does not mention the phrase
“conspiracy theory” or any of its derivatives. However, it contains
some hostility in the first and last sentences, giving it a hostility
rating of two.
DATA PREPARATION
While a wide variety of comments were obtained, certain serial
commenters tended to dominate the conversation across several
news articles and even multiple websites. The sample of 2174
comments contained 1156 unique authors, of whom 321 com-
mented more than once. Therefore, in addition to analyzing the
entire collection of comments, we conducted a separate analysis
in which we calculated the mean values of each variable for each
individual author and repeated the analysis on the level of authors
rather than comments. All results obtained below were found at
both the author and comment levels of analysis, which provides
some assurance that any effects found are not the result of a few
prolific commenters skewing the overall distribution of the data.
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For the sake of brevity, however, only the comment-level analysis
is reported below.
INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
A random sample of 10% of the comments was coded by a sec-
ond rater, and reliability analyses were conducted to determine
the degree of concordance between the two raters. Cohen’s kappa
(κ) was used for all variables except hostility, the only ordinal
variable, for which we instead calculated the intraclass correla-
tion coefficient (ICC). Values of κ from 0.81 to 1.00 indicate
almost perfect reliability, while reliability between 0.61 and 0.80
is considered “substantial” and from 0.41 to 0.60 “moderate”
(Landis and Koch, 1977). Agreement regarding the conspiracist
vs. conventionalist tone of each comment was high, κ = 0.84.
As the reliability of the other variables used would depend
heavily upon their classification as conspiracist or conventional-
ist, further reliability analyses were limited to those comments
on whose tone both raters agreed. Accordingly, advocacy of
the commenter’s own explanation (κ = 0.64), derogation of the
opposing explanation (κ = 0.61), and the usage of “conspiracy
theory” (κ = 0.70) all showed substantial interrater reliability,
while mistrust (κ = 0.49) and direct statements of what hap-
pened (κ = 0.55) showed moderate reliability (Landis and Koch,
1977). Hostility ratings were likewise acceptably reliable, ICC =
0.72. Finally, so few examples of powerlessness were found in the
results that it was impossible to draw any conclusions regarding
their relative prevalence in conspiracist and conventionalist com-
ments. As such, reliability analyses were not performed on this
variable.
RESULTS
Of the 2174 comments collected, 1459 were coded as conspir-
acist and 715 as conventionalist. The four news websites did
not contribute equally to the sample, with 65 comments in
15 threads coming from ABC News, 632 in 29 threads from
CNN, 1006 in 64 threads from the Daily Mail, and 471 in 27
threads from the Independent. Nevertheless, each site had approx-
imately the same proportions of conspiracist and conventionalist
comments—specifically, about twice as many conspiracist com-
ments as conventionalist: for ABC, 21 conventionalist and 44
conspiracist; for CNN, 218 conventionalist and 414 conspiracist;
for the Daily Mail, 330 conventionalist and 676 conspiracist; and
for the Independent, 146 conventionalist and 325 conspiracist;
χ2(3) = 1.514, p = 0.68.
Table 1 shows the general results of the coding analysis. In line
with our predictions, conspiracist comments mentioned more
non-9/11 conspiracy theories as being correct than convention-
alist comments [M = 0.12 per comment vs. M = 0.02; t(2172) =
3.82, p < 0.001] and fewer such theories as being incorrect [M =
0.02 per comment vs. M = 0.18; t(2172) = −7.51, p < 0.001].
Likewise, conspiracist comments were more likely to express mis-
trust than their conventionalist counterparts [10.6% vs. 1.4%;
χ2(1) = 57.22, p < 0.001]. We were unable to test the powerless-
ness prediction, however, as only two comments in the entire
sample contained expressions of powerlessness.
Analysis revealed a number of differences between the rhetori-
cal styles of conspiracist and conventionalist commenters. Thirty-
one percent of conspiracist comments contained information
that constituted support for their own position, compared to
56% of conventionalist comments. This difference was signifi-
cant, χ2
(1) = 121.69, p < 0.001. In contrast, 64% of conspiracist
comments involved derogation of the opposing explanation, sig-
nificantly more than the 44% of conventionalist comments that
did the same, χ2
(1) = 80.13, p < 0.001. Unexpectedly, while only
19% of conventionalist comments directly put forward an expla-
nation for the events of 9/11, 52% of conspiracist comments did
so, χ2
(1) = 53.56, p < 0.001.
Conventionalist comments (M = 2.08, SD = 1.02) were sig-
nificantly more hostile than conspiracist comments (M = 1.44,
SD = 0.79), t(2172) = 16.22, p < 0.001 (see Table 1). Finally, nei-
ther conspiracists nor conventionalists were particularly willing
to self-apply the term “conspiracy theory” or its derivatives: only
31 conspiracist comments referred to their beliefs as such, while
63 used the term to describe the official story of 9/11, four used
it to describe both theories, and 65 disputed others’ use of it.
Conventionalists were likely to call opposing beliefs conspiracy
theories, with 166 doing so, compared to only a single comment
that self-applied the term and another one that contested its appli-
cability. No conventionalist comments called both explanations
“conspiracy theories.”
Table 1 | Rhetorical components of conspiracist and conventionalist comments.
Conspiracist Conventionalist
Mean conspiracy theories mentioned favorably 0.12 0.02
Mean conspiracy theories mentioned unfavorably 0.02 0.18
Mean hostility (1–5 scale) 1.43 2.07
% comments expressing mistrust 10.6 1.4
% comments advocating own explanation 31 56
% comments derogating other explanation 64 44
% comments explicitly providing a description of what happened 52 19
% comments describing own belief as a conspiracy theory 2.1 0.1
% comments describing opposing belief as a conspiracy theory 4.3 23.2
% comments describing both own and other beliefs as conspiracy theories 0.3 0
% comments disputing usage of “conspiracy theory” 4.5 0.1
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DISCUSSION
The data were generally consistent with our predictions.
Conspiracist comments expressed more favorable opinions about
unrelated conspiracy theories than conventionalist comments
did. This serves as a conceptual replication of previous findings
indicating that beliefs in conspiracy theories tend to be correlated:
if someone agrees with 9/11 conspiracy theories, they are also
more likely to agree with other conspiracy theories (e.g., Goertzel,
1994; Swami et al., 2010, 2011; Wood et al., 2012). Further, in
accordance with previous work on the role of trust in conspiracy
theory beliefs (e.g., Wright and Arbuthnot, 1974; Abalakina-Paap
et al., 1999; Simmons and Parsons, 2005), conspiracist comments
were more likely to contain expressions of mistrust than were
conventionalist comments. Despite the unexpected impossibil-
ity of testing the powerlessness hypothesis, this cluster of results
should increase confidence in the validity of the remainder of the
present study’s conclusions. The well-established tendencies for
conspiracists to be less trusting than average and for conspiracy
theory beliefs to intercorrelate have manifested themselves in the
persuasive communications examined, which suggests that other
tendencies may do so as well.
Most notably, and in accordance with the idea that oppo-
sition to officialdom is a major component of the conspiracist
belief system, conspiracy advocates showed a tendency to spend
much more time arguing against the official explanation of 9/11
than advocating an alternative. Conspiracy opponents showed the
opposite pattern, advocating their own explanation more than
they argued against the opposing one. This pattern of results sup-
ports the idea that conspiracy theories have their basis more in
opposition to officialdom than in beliefs in specific alternative
theories (Dean, 2002; Wood et al., 2012). For the adherents of the
9/11 TruthMovement examined here, the search for truth consists
mostly of finding ways in which the official story cannot be true.
There is much less of a focus on defending coherent explanations
that can better account for the available evidence. However, con-
spiracists were more likely to provide direct explanations for the
events of 9/11 than their conventionalist counterparts were—for
instance, it was more common to see a comment saying “9/11 was
an inside job” or “WTC7 was demolished” than “9/11 was done
by terrorists” or “WTC7 collapsed because of fires and structural
damage.” This seems like a paradoxical pattern, but conspiracist
comments often simply stated that 9/11 was an inside job as a sort
of slogan without much to support it. Many other comments took
the form “the official story is impossible, therefore 9/11 was the
result of a conspiracy.” For instance, one representative comment
from a CNN article read, “Inside Job 9/11! If it was a real terror-
ist attack U.S. military would have blew up the planes while in
the air before they could hit any population area!” Furthermore,
many of the news articles on which the comments appeared fea-
tured the official explanation of 9/11 in some detail, meaning that
it may have been less necessary for conventionalists to summarize
the conventional account themselves.
We also found that hostility was higher in persuasive argu-
ments made by conventionalists than in those by conspiracists.
As 9/11 conspiracism is by and large a minority viewpoint in the
West (WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008), this makes sense: conven-
tionalists, rather than focusing on presenting novel information,
instead attempt to enforce conformity to the majority viewpoint
(Latané, 1981). While the inter-rater reliability for hostility was
good, there is a risk that we may not have captured the full spec-
trum of responses, as we specifically excluded comments that
consisted solely of threats, insults, or ridicule. As such, although
we cannot say with certainty that conventionalist comments are
more hostile on average than conspiracist comments, we can say
with some confidence that this is true among comments that also
contained some amount of persuasive content.
Finally, the statistics on the usage of the phrase “conspiracy
theory” provide an instructive illustration of how the term is
viewed. Few people were eager to apply it to their own positions.
Conspiracists were more likely to apply it to the conventional
narrative, often counterintuitively referring to it as “the official
conspiracy theory,” or to dismiss the term as needlessly loaded
and derogatory, consistent with recent scholarly characterizations
(Bratich, 2008). Part of the problem is likely to be the vagueness
of the term; while we have provided a working definition in the
present study, there is no universal agreement on what exactly
constitutes a conspiracy theory (Coady, 2006). Clearly, however,
the prevalence of counter-argumentation to the use of the label by
others points to some disdain for the term among conspiracists.
There are other possible interpretations for some of these
results. For instance, the observed difference in the usage of
other conspiracy theories between conspiracist and convention-
alist comments could be seen as an issue of rhetorical congruence
more than of genuine belief. This pattern could naturally arise as
the result of an inclination toward arguing by analogy: conspir-
acists might compare the 9/11 attacks to the JFK assassination,
which a majority of Americans believe was the result of a con-
spiracy (Goertzel, 1994), in order to make a conspiracy theory
seem more plausible. In contrast, conventionalists could compare
9/11 conspiracy theories to more overtly implausible examples,
such as the proposed cover-up of the existence of Bigfoot or
the idea that Elvis Presley is still alive, in order to make the
point that conspiracy theories in general are not to be taken seri-
ously. Indeed, a post-hoc examination of the data revealed that
23 comments mentioned the JFK assassination conspiracy the-
ory favorably, while only nine mentioned it negatively. The 7/7
bombing conspiracy theories showed a similar pattern, with 6
negative mentions to 16 positive. Other theories, such as those
concerning the moon landing (27 negative, 6 positive), Elvis (21
negative, 0 positive), aliens (20 negative, 2 positive), and David
Icke’s reptilian shapeshifters (8 negative, 1 positive), showed the
opposite pattern. Not all of these mentions followed the general
pattern evident in the data; some conventionalists said that while
some other conspiracy theories are true, there is no evidence for a
9/11 conspiracy, and some conspiracists claimed that while most
conspiracy theories are bogus, in the case of 9/11 the evidence
is sufficient to reject the official story. This form of argument
might ultimately be persuasive: people who portray themselves as
nominal conventionalists who nevertheless, find 9/11 conspiracy
theories plausible are essentially portraying themselves as deviant
ingroup members. Such people can be very effective in exerting
social influence on the majority (e.g., Maass and Clark, 1984).
Ideas of rhetorical congruency and self-presentation recall the
issue of whether people’s persuasive communications are really an
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accurate reflection of their own thoughts and ideas rather than a
carefully calculated attempt to engage with others’ biases and rea-
soning. The 9/11 Truth Movement is, by and large, a movement
of converts—most “Truthers,” at some point, became convinced
that their previous belief in the official story was wrong (Kay,
2011). Therefore, in debating with those who hold the positions
they previously held, they might repeat the arguments that first
caused them to doubt the conventional narrative and shaped their
subsequent thinking accordingly. On the other hand, the actual
content that the discussions centered upon was often highly tech-
nical, and many of the arguments were unlikely to have been
generated entirely by the people doing the commenting. While
some commenters made intuitive judgments about the physics of
crashing airplanes and collapsing buildings, many others relied
on arguments advanced in websites or documentaries devoted
to either advancing or debunking 9/11 conspiracy theories. With
the amount of information to choose from, however, the argu-
ments commenters chose to put forward may still reveal useful
information about their own decision-making.
While the results of the present study fit with previous work
on belief and disbelief in conspiracy theories, some of the novel
results found here would benefit from confirmation via other
methodological approaches. If conspiracist beliefs are generally
structured in the way we posit, it should be observable under
experimental conditions—for instance, people with a conspiracist
worldview might find a piece of evidence to be more convinc-
ing if it is presented as a refutation of the official account of
some event rather than as proof of a specific conspiracy theory.
Likewise, while we have confirmed that “conspiracy theorist” is
not a well-liked term among conspiracists, we have not investi-
gated its impact—if the term is used to describe a certain account
of an event, the negative associations of it might reduce the
perceived plausibility of the argument.
In sum, our results are in agreement with predictions derived
from prior research. Consistent with much of the existing litera-
ture on individual differences associated with conspiracy belief,
comments that supported 9/11 conspiracy theories were more
likely to express mistrust and to refer to other conspiracy theo-
ries favorably. Conspiracists were less overtly hostile than their
conventionalist counterparts, and did not appreciate being called
conspiracy theorists. Perhaps most importantly, however, the
finding that conspiracists spend more time arguing against offi-
cial explanations than for alternative explanations supports the
idea that the conspiracy worldview is basedmore on disbelief than
on positive belief. The coherence of the conspiracist belief system
is driven by higher-order considerations such as a disbelief in offi-
cial narratives, rather than positive beliefs in particular alternative
narratives. This result also agrees with previous informal observa-
tions by conventionalist commentators, who devote a great deal of
time to examining and debunking conspiracy theories. One tac-
tic which conventionalists often accuse conspiracists of using is
“anomaly hunting”:
They imagine that if they can find (broadly defined) anomalies
in that data that would point to another phenomenon at work.
They then commit a pair of logical fallacies. First, they confuse
unexplained with unexplainable. This leads them to prematurely
declare something a true anomaly, without first exhaustively try-
ing to explain it with conventional means. Second they use the
argument from ignorance, saying that because we cannot explain
an anomaly that means their specific pet theory must be true. I
don’t know what that fuzzy object in the sky is—therefore it is an
alien spacecraft (Novella, 2009).
The observed tendency of conspiracy theory advocates to argue
against conventional narratives rather than in favor of particular
alternatives closely resembles this description of anomaly hunt-
ing, and also parallels Keeley’s (1999) observation that conspiracy
theories rely heavily on “errant data” rather than on crafting
coherent alternative explanations (p. 117). We argue that in fact,
anomaly hunting, or a fixation on errant data, is a manifesta-
tion of the way conspiracism is structured as a worldview. In
general, conspiracy belief is not based around specific theories
of how events transpire, though these may exist as well. Instead,
conspiracism is rooted in several higher-order beliefs such as an
abiding mistrust of authority, the conviction that nothing is quite
as it seems, and the belief that most of what we are told is a lie.
Apparent anomalies in official accounts seem to support this, even
if they do not point to a specific, well-defined alternative. For
many conspiracists, there are two worlds: one real and (mostly)
unseen, the other a sinister illusion meant to cover up the truth;
and evidence against the latter is evidence for the former.
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